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We present an alternative explanation of the positive relationship be-
tween total fertility rate (TFR) and female labor participation rate (FLPR)
observed in recent cross section of OECD countries. We rst show qual-
ity adjusted consumption is related to fertility and female labor supply
in a general equilibrium model with vertical quality dierentiation and
heterogeneous labor. Then we verify this relationship with Japanese cross
sectional data from 8 dierent points in time (every ve years from 1970
{ 2005) in which a positive correlation between TFR and FLPR among
prefectures (regions) have been observed since 1980. We show that con-
sumption variables are statistically signicant when they are added to
the cross section regression of TFR on FLPR. However, the FLPR coef-
cient is no longer signicant at the 5% level when quality of consump-
tion variables are included in the regression. Furthermore, FLPR has a
statistically signicant negative eect on TFR in addition to the statis-
tically signicant consumption variables, once we take both time-variant
regional heterogeneity of consumption and time-invariant heterogeneity
into account using the xed eect model.
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11 Introduction
In this paper we present an explanation to the positive relationship between
fertility rate and female labor participation rate observed in cross section of
OECD countries. We rst show theoretically that there is a relationship between
quality of consumption and number of children (Aoki (2008)). This re
ects
not only preference of workers between consumption and children but also the
labor market and wages for skilled labor necessary for high quality goods and
unskilled labor necessary for the standard goods. In particular the relationship
between labor supply and number of children dier by skill level, meaning the
relationship may be positive or negative. The theoretical implications are upheld
by Japanese cross sectional data from 1970 to 2005. This constitutes the second
half of the paper.
Time series among many OECD countries show negative relationship be-
tween female labor participation and TFR (Figure 1), while cross country in
2005 (average of years 1985-1996 as well as year 2000, Sleebos (2003), d'Addio
and d'Ercole (2005), Da Rocha and Fuster (2006)) show a positive relationship.
In Japan, although time series relationship has been negative for 1980 - 2000
(Figure 1) , cross section among prefectures show positive relationship in 1987
and 2002 (Figure 2). Obviously conditions that dier across regions in Japan
are dierent from dierence between two points in time. We also note that
countries with high per capita GDP have low birthrates (Figure 3), suggesting
low fertility may be correlated with high consumption.
The theoretical model is in the spirit to papers in growth and trade that take
into account the reaction of the economy in the long run (Acemoglu (1998), Flam
and Helpman (1987), Thoenig and Verdier (2003)). Acemoglu (1998) showed
that while in the short run, labor input is reduced in response to scarcity of
skilled labor and high wages, skilled labor supply increase in response triggers
technological change that makes skilled labor even more productive, raising
skilled labor wage in the long run. Our analysis suggests that a similar long
term adjustment of the economy will prevent a natural feedback mechanism
from working. That is, smaller population will increase marginal product of
labor more productive in the short run but consumption pattern will change in
the long run reducing such an advantage.
In Section 2 we present a theoretical framework that derives a relationship
between quality of consumption and number of children. In Section 3, we verify
the results using Japanese data from 1970 to 2000.
1Figure 1: Time Series TFR and Female Labor Supply, OECD Countries
Figure 2: Japanese TFR and FLPR by Region
2Figure 3: Cross Section TFR and Per Capita GDP
2 Theoretical Analysis
In this section we analyze a general equilibrium model in which consumers dier
by two attributes, their preference and skill level of labor. Consumers choose
either to consumer high quality product or standard (low quality) product.
Child bearing choice dier according to which product they choose, as well as if
they are skilled or not since wages dier according to skill level. Skilled workers
produce the high quality product and the labor supply level determine the level
of quality.
2.1 General Equilibrium with High Quality Product and
Heterogenous Labor
Consumers
We simplify the consumer's problem so that she chooses between consumption
(x) and childbearing (n). Her preference is represented by the following utility
function which also depends on the quality of the good consumed, Q,
U(n;x) = (Qx + n)
1
 ; 0 <  < 1: (1)
Consumers preference, , is distributed uniformly over [0,1]. Consumption good
is either the standard (low quality) Q = 1 or high quality Q > 1. Consumer's la-
3bor endowment is  ` and wage is w which is also the opportunity cost of children.
Denoting price of the good by p, consumer chooses consumption and number of
children to maximize (1) with respect to the budget constraint,
px + wn = w `:
Each consumer's consumption and number of children given quality Q is deter-





















Consumption is increasing and number of children is decreasing in quality, as
in the previous section. The indirect utility is,









The consumer must choose which quality to consume. If her marginal utility
from more consumption is relatively large, she devotes less resources to children
and has fewer children. If the quality is low and not as benecial, she derives
utility by having many children. She compares the utility levels from consuming
each quality and buys whichever yields higher utility. We denote the prices of
the goods with dierent qualities by pH and pL. Consumer will buy the high
quality good when
v(pH;w;Q) > v(pL;w;1):
This condition is equivalent to,








Since  > 1, there will be no demand for the low quality good if ln
pH
pL < lnQ.
This occurs if low quality product is more expensive ( pL  pH) since Q > 1
and pH > pL but the price premium for the high quality is small relative to
dierence in quality. It does not depend on the level of income.
Consumer's labor supply is the hours not devoted to raising children,







The labor each consumer supplies is either skilled (s) or unskilled (u). There
are total of N consumers, and  2 (0;1) of the consumers are skilled. Labor
endowment,  `, is the same for both types. We denote wages for skilled and
unskilled by ws and wu. Production technology is constant returns to scale in
labor: one unit of skilled labor produces one unit of high quality product and one
unit of unskilled labor produces one unit of the standard product. Furthermore
we assume both products are supplied competitively, meaning pH = ws and
pL = wu.
One skilled worker's demand for high quality product is , denoting relative
wage by  = ws
wu > 1 and using (2),
xH








and her demand for low quality product is,
xL




;  > ^ :
There will be positive demand for the low quality product only if  > 1 since
 =
pH
pL . We make the following observation
Claim 1. High skilled consumers consume more of both quality, xH
s () > xH
u ()
and xL
s () > xL
u().
Total demand from all the skilled workers for high quality product and low










Similarly for unskilled workers, we have the individual demands for high quality
good,
xH
u () = x
(ws;wu;Q) =
Q `
 (Q1  + 1)










;  > ^ :










Since production of one unit of good requires one unit of labor, demand for























Labor supply is constructed in a similar manner from individual supplies.
Individual labor supply as function of relative wage is , using (4) ,
`H




;  < ^ ;
`L




;  > ^ 
`H
u () = `
(ws;wu;Q) =
Q `






;  > ^ :
Aggregation yields the total labor supply of each type,
LS



















It is easy to show, from (3), that ^  is decreasing in  that LD
s and LS
u is decreasing
in  = ws
wu and LS
s and LD
u are increasing in . Equilibrium relative wage for
a given quality level, (Q), is determined by the skilled labor market clearing
condition,
LD
s () = LS
s ():
The unskilled labor market has cleared by Walrus Law.
62.2 Comparative statics
We rst see how the equilibrium labor supply and relative wage change with
quality.
Claim 2. (i) LS
s , LS
u and LD
s are increasing and LD
u are decreasing in Q.
(ii) Equilibrium relative wages and level of skilled labor are increasing in qual-
ity. That is, @(Q)=@Q > 0 and @L
s(Q)=@Q > 0.
(See Figures 4 and 5. Proof is in the Appendix.) Higher quality makes
consumption attractive for skilled workers and also increases proportion of all
workers that consume the high quality product. Thus both demand and supply
of skilled labor is increasing in quality. The same eect increases the supply of
unskilled workers and reduces demand for low quality good. The latter eect
implies demand for unskilled workers decreases when quality improves.
Figure 4: Equilibrium in Skilled Labor Market
Skilled labor supply is increasing in population, @LS
s =@N > 0, from (7) and
demand is also increasing in population, @LD
s =@N > 0, from (5). (See proof of
Claim 2 in the Appendix.) This implies
Claim 3. Both equilibrium skilled and unskilled labor will increase when popu-
lation increases, @L
s=@N > 0 and @L
u=@N > 0.
Again, using the proof of Claim 2 in the Appendix, both demand and supply
of skilled labor are also increasing in proportion of skilled consumers, @LS
s =@ >
0, from (7) and @LD
s =@ > 0, from (5).
7Figure 5: Equilibrium in Skilled Labor Market
Claim 4. Equilibrium skilled labor and equilibrium relative wage are increasing
in the proportion of skilled consumers,@L
s=@ > 0 and @=@ > 0.
Birthrate
Individual number of children are,
nH




;  < ^ ;
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;  > ^ 
nH










;  > ^ :
It is clear that for given wage level, those that consume high quality good de-
voted even more resources for consumption and thus reduce number of children
when quality improves. Since the equilibrium relative wage is increasing in
quality, we can say the following,
Claim 5. (i) Skilled consumers have less children . That is , nH
s < nH
u for
 < ^  and nL
s < nL
u for  > ^ .
(ii) Skilled consumers have less children when quality of product improves.
8That is, dnH
s =dQ < 0 for  < ^  and dnL
s =dQ < 0 for  > ^ .
(iii) Unskilled consumers that consume low quality product have the same num-
ber of children when quality improves. That is, dnL
u=dQ = 0 for  > ^ .
The substitution eect dominates for skilled workers that consume low qual-
ity and they reduce number of children. For unskilled consumers that bought
high quality good, improvement makes consumption more attractive (reduce
children) but their relative wage becomes lower and the income eect works in
the opposite direction. The total eect is not clear.
Endogenous quality
We have so far assumed that quality Q is exogenously determined. In this section
we pride a brief explanation of how quality can be determined endogenously.
Assume that level of quality is increasing in the size of the skilled labor. That is,
Q = QT(Ls) is an increasing function of Q. Subscript T refers to \technology"
which is what this relationship re
ects. We will denote the inverse relationship
between the market equilibrium supply of skilled labor and quality of L
s(Q) by
Q = QM(Ls), which is an increasing function from Claim 2. The equilibrium
level of labor L
s and equilibrium level of quality, Q = QM(L
s) = QT(L
s), is
the intersection of the two curves.
When marginal increase in quality from labor is very large, then the equi-
librium is unstable. Graphically, this would mean slope of QT is steeper than
QM (Q0
T > Q0
M) . This is the case around equilibrium E1 in Figure 6. A per-
turbation away from E1 results in either spiral increase in quality and skilled
labor supply or decrease of quality and skilled labor supply. When technology
is mature so that marginal quality improvement is very small, then equilibrium
is stable (Q0
T < Q0
M) . This is equilibrium E2 in Figure 6. There may be mul-
tiple equilibria, some stable and others unstable. A slight perturbation from
low quality with small skilled labor force will start a spiral of labor and quality
improvement until E2 is reached.
3 Empirical Application
In this section we examine the empirical evidence to support the theoretical
implications of the previous sections. In Section 3.1, we present the data with
descriptive statistics and conrm the positive relationship between total fertility
rate (TFR) and female labor participation rate (FLPR) among regions (prefec-
tures) in Japan, as seen in other OECD countries. We present the estimation
results in Section 3.2. We estimate the equations that assume that regional TFR
9Figure 6: Equilibrium Relationship Between Quality and Skilled Labor
is aected by regional variables that re
ect quality or variety of consumption
goods. Specically we consider household leisure and entertainment expendi-
tures, automobile ownership, and number of department stores as explanatory
variables, in addition to the traditional marriage and other family variables. We
employ the xed eects model to take into account the unobserved heterogeneity
among regions.
3.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
We use data from 47 prefectures for years 1970, 75, 80, 85, 90, 2000, and 2005
(Okinawa prefecture is not included in 1970). Figure 7 plots correlation coe-
cients between regional TFR and FLRP by the 8 years from 1970 { 2005. The
coecient is negative for 1975 but is positive thereafter. For the last few years,
the correlation is not only positive but close to 0.5 , a very clear positive rela-
tionship between TFR and FLRP. This is similar to the phenomenon observed
in other OECD countries in recent years. We will be controlling for consump-
tion variables implied by the proceeding theoretical model to understand the
relationship.
The labels and source of the variables for the regression in the next section
are summarized in Table 1. We introduce some new variables as determinants of
TFR in addition to the traditional marriage variables. In order to capture qual-
ity of consumption, we use proportion of leisure and entertainment expenditure
10Figure 7: Correlation Coecient by Year
in household expenditure , automobile ownership per working population, and
number of department stores, which usually specialize in high end products.
Table 2 summarizes the change through time by depicting mean, standard
deviation, minimum and maximum values for each variable for each year. The
steady decline of TFR is striking and TFR in 2005 has been decreased to al-
most one-half of that in 1975. The number of married couples has been declin-
ing as well. FLPR declines slightly in the period, but the standard deviation
has changed from 6.313 (in 1975) to 2.467 (in 2005), implying that prefectures
have become more homogeneous for FLPR. There is a similar phenomenon in
marriage standard deviation. On the other hand, we also observe that some
variables have had rising means (proportion of one-person households, propor-
tion of leisure and entertainment expenditure, automobile ownership rate and
number of department stores), especially means of automobile ownership and
the number of department store have risen substantially. And their standard
deviations have increased, suggesting they could be better explanatory variables
for heterogeneity of prefectures. In Section 3.2 we regress TFR on FLPR and
other variables, and apply the xed eect model to our panel data to incorporate
unobservable heterogeneity among prefectures.


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































12Variable Year Mean S.D. Min Max Obs.
TFR 1970 2.092 0.116 1.88 2.35 46
1975 2.001 0.165 1.63 2.88 47
1980 1.829 0.135 1.44 2.38 47
1985 1.825 0.125 1.44 2.31 47
1990 1.616 0.125 1.23 1.95 47
1995 1.525 0.134 1.11 1.87 47
2000 1.473 0.133 1.07 1.82 47
2005 1.307 0.122 0.98 1.71 47
FLPR 1970 54.48 6.313 40.2 65.5 46
1975 48.55 5.730 35.7 58.8 47
1980 49.06 5.260 36.3 59.4 47
1985 49.26 4.398 37.6 57.5 47
1990 49.39 3.743 38.7 56.3 47
1995 49.87 3.178 40.7 56.1 47
2000 48.91 2.850 40.8 54.0 47
2005 48.57 2.467 41.9 53.1 47
Marriages 1970 8.980 1.458 6.4 12.5 46
1975 7.987 0.695 6.5 9.6 47
1980 6.383 0.496 5.3 7.7 47
1985 5.853 0.429 5.1 7.3 47
1990 5.453 0.570 4.5 7.0 47
1995 5.885 0.658 4.8 7.6 47
2000 5.936 0.589 4.8 7.4 47
2005 5.272 0.554 4.3 6.9 47
One-person Household 1970 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
1975 0.113 0.033 0.068 0.256 47
1980 0.130 0.033 0.083 0.267 47
1985 0.180 0.039 0.121 0.339 47
1990 0.201 0.039 0.143 0.359 47
One-person Household 1995 0.229 0.039 0.176 0.381 47
2000 0.250 0.040 0.191 0.409 47
2005 0.267 0.040 0.209 0.425 47
Leisure & Entertainment 1970 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A.
1975 0.0827 0.008 0.063 0.106 47
1980 0.0849 0.009 0.068 0.111 47
1985 0.0884 0.008 0.070 0.115 47
13Variable Year Mean S.D. Min Max Obs.
1990 0.0952 0.008 0.080 0.113 47
1995 0.0960 0.010 0.076 0.121 47
2000 0.1001 0.009 0.080 0.120 47
2005 0.1021 0.010 0.076 0.127 47
Automobile Ownership 1970 0.120 0.027 0.068 0.184 46
1975 0.238 0.038 0.164 0.333 47
1980 0.319 0.048 0.212 0.443 47
1985 0.354 0.051 0.246 0.478 47
1990 0.428 0.056 0.304 0.560 47
1995 0.561 0.078 0.341 0.718 47
2000 0.681 0.105 0.358 0.852 47
2005 0.773 0.127 0.365 0.956 47
Department Store 1970 17.196 20.72 3 123 46
1975 29.213 37.56 4 203 47
1980 35.532 41.94 2 231 47
1985 51.617 59.26 7 300 47
1990 57.106 59.05 5 242 47
1995 44.596 45.37 3 235 47
2000 65.085 63.89 11 322 47
2005 63.447 60.69 12 295 47
143.2 Estimation Results
Table 3 is from cross section regression of TFR on all variables in Table 2. The
regression equation is,
TFRi = c + 1FLPRi + 2Marriagei + 3Onepersoni (9)
+4Leisurei + 5Automobilei + 6Dpt:Storei + i; (1)
where i = 1;:::;47, c is the constant term, j;j = 1;:::;6 are unknown param-
eters and  is the error term.
Table 3 only shows the estimated coecient( ^ 1) of FLRP and  indicates
the null hypothesis 1 = 0 can be rejected at 5% signicance level. Although
we could observe positive correlation between FRP and FLRP by the Pearson's
Correlation Coecient (See Figure 7), after adding to the consumption vari-
ables, the FLPR coecient is no longer signicant at the 5% level. However,
the coecient is signicantly positive when cross sections are pooled for 1975 {
2005 with FLRP = 0:066.
Table 3: Estimation Coecient of FLPR
1975 1980 1985 1990
-0.002 0.0072 0.0029 0.0072
1995 2000 2005 1970-2005
0.0056 0.0064 0.070 0.0066
We believe that the variables we employ do not completely explain the het-
erogeneity of TFR. We suspect that there must be correlate with the error term,
which causes a bias in the OLS estimators, as is often the case. To address this
problem, we assume the heterogeneity among the prefectures is time invariant
and apply the xed eect model to our panel data which will guarantee a consis-
tent estimation even with unobservable heterogeneity. We show the estimation
results in Table 4, Column 1 of Table 4 is the pooled OLS regression result of
equation 10, where t = 1975;:::;2005 and  is the constant term.
TFRi;t =  + 1FLPRi;t + 2Marriagei;t + 3Onepersoni;t (10)
+4Leisurei;t + 5Automobilei;t + 6Dpt:Storei;t + i;t (2)
Column 2 is regression result of equation 3. This is a xed eects model
that takes into account of heterogeneity() and FLRP is the only dependent
15variable.
TFRi;t = i + 1FLPRi;t + i;t (3)
FLPR coecients become signicantly positive the two regressions, (10) and
(refreg3).
Column 3 shows a regression results of equation 4, where we obtain the
negative coecient of FLPR and it is signicant.
TFRi;t = i + 1FLPRi;t + 2Marriagei;t + 3Onepersoni;t
+4Leisurei;t + 5Automobilei;t + 6Dpt:Storei;t + i;t: (4)
We summarize the estimation results of other variables brie
y. The co-
ecient marriages, which we expected has positive correlation with TFR, is
signicantly positive, the region which has large number of married couples
rather than other region achieve at higher TFR. High proportion of one-person
households, proportion of leisure and entertainment expenditure and automo-
bile ownership rate all give negative impact on TFR. In column 1, although we
could see the negative correlation of department store numbers with TFR, it is
not signicant.
We conclude that our empirical investigation conrms the explanations of
TFR and FLPR relationships of the theoretical model. Variables that capture
consumption quality, such as household leisure and entertainment expenditures,
automobile ownership, and number of department stores, have signicant co-
ecients when they are added to the cross section regression model of TFR
regressed on FLPR. And the FLPR coecient is no longer signicant at the 5%
level (See Table 3). Furthermore, we found that FLPR has a statistically signif-
icant negative eect on TFR while consumption variables are statistically sig-
nicant, once we take both time-variant regional heterogeneity of consumption
and time-invariant heterogeneity into account using the xed eect model.We
also note that our results suggest that much of the distinction between the ur-
ban and rural areas in fertility patterns (Council for Gender Equality, Special
Committee on the Declining Birthrate and Gender-Equal Participation, 2006b),
can be explained by the dierences in consumption patterns.
4 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have presented an alternative explanation of the positive rela-
tionship between total fertility rate (TFR) and female labor participation rate
(FLPR) observed in a cross section of OECD countries in recent years.
16Table 4: Estimation Results
Pooled OLS Fixed Eect Model 1 Fixed Eect Model 2
Variables Coecients Coecients Coecients
(t-value) (t-value) (t-value)
FLPR 0.0066(2.21)** 0.029 (5.32)** -0.025 (-9.14)**
Marriages 0.053 (6.02)** 0.044 (7.05)**
One-person - -1.174 (-6.25)** -0.626 (-2.52)**
households
Leisure -4.162 (-5.66)** -1.597 (-3.11)**
& Entertainment
Automobile - -0.415 (-7.47)** -0.819 (-13.60**)
ownership
Department - -0.001 (-6.54)** 0.0003 (1.12)
store
constant 1.889 (13.82)** 0.216 (0.77) 3.237 (23.76)**
R2 0.806 0.079 0.937
Hausman Test N.A. 7.88** 51.51**
Obs. 329 375 329
In the rst half, we showed how low fertility is associated with consump-
tion of higher quality products using a general equilibrium model with vertical
quality dierentiation and heterogeneous labor. Higher quality product has
two eects: it makes consumption more attractive but also increases wage for
skilled workers. The second eect make working more attractive and the re-
sulting income eect implies having more children or consuming more higher
quality product or both. If the income eect dominates, higher labor participa-
tion and higher birthrate will be observed when income eect dominates. If the
substitution eect dominates, the relationship will be negative. In both cases,
there will be a negative relationship between birthrate and consumption.
In the second half, we employed Japanese cross section from 8 dierent points
in time (every ve years from 1970 { 2005), that have also shown a positive
correlation between TFR and FLPR in recent years to test the theory. We have
shown signicant coecients for consumption variables when they are added to
the cross section regression of TFR on FLPR. However, the FLPR coecient is
no longer signicant at the 5% level once the consumption variables are included.
Furthermore, FLPR has a statistically signicant negative eect on TFR, and
also consumption variables are statistically signicant in a xed eects model.
The results are consistent with our new model as well as traditional economic
models of the relation between TFR and FLPR.
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19Appendix
Proof of Claim 2
The demand and supply functions, (5),(6), (7), and (8), can be rewritten as,
LS




















































The claim follows from noting that ^  is decreasing in  and increasing in Q,
and that Q1  > 1 for  < ^ .
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